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RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Edited by the
LEGAL PUBLICATIONS BOARD OF
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OLIVER M. TOWNSEND, Case Editor

PUBLIC ENEMY LAWS-CONSTITUOF.-[New Jersey] Most
legislative attempts to control
criminality are generally, in application, designed to punish violators
who may come within the defined
limits of the act regardless of economic position, class distinctions.
or personal fame. They seek to
prevent crime by punishing crime.
However such legislation has not
always been successful in protecting the community, and the legislatures of several states have endeavored to enact laws which might
prevent a criminal act by defining
and classifying groups likely to
commit such offenses. In other
words the legislatures have proceeded upon the theory that certain persons in the community are
more likely than others to commit
crimes.
Under this broad and illusive
principle, three types of statutes in
particular have been passed, all designed to punish for what persons
are, rather than what they did.
First is the Habitual Criminal
Laws; second, the well-known Vagrancy Acts; finally the statutes
concerned in the present discussion, the "Reputation" or "Public
Enemy" laws.
The Constitutionality of the Vagrancy and Habitual Criminal Acts
TIONALITY

appears to be well settled. As to
Vagrancy see 8 R. C. L. 339, 92 A.
L. R. 68. For Habitual Criminal
Acts see 8 R. C. L. 271, 82 A. L. R.
345. As to the validity of the "Reputation" statutes, the case arising
in New Jersey and now pending in
the Supreme Court of the United
States brings this strikingly to the
fore. State v. Lanzetti, and State
v. Pius, 118 N. J. L. 212, 192 Atl.
89 (1937), reviewed in 120 N. J. L.
189, 198 Atl. 837 (1938).
In this case the Supreme Court
of New Jersey declared valid the
"Gangster Act." This act provides
for the punishment by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars and
imprisonment not exceeding twenty
years or both of "any person not
engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of a gang
consisting of two or more persons,
who has been convicted at least
three times of being a disorderly
person, or who has been convicted
of any crime in this or any other
state . . . ." Participants in labor
disputes are expressly excepted.
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §2:136-4.
In the state court the defendants
were convicted of having violated
the act and in answer to their allegations questioning its constitutionality, the court found that they
were not denied due process nor
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the equal protection of the laws,
relying on a previous case of similar character. State v. Bell, 15
N. J. Misc. 109, 188 Atl. 737 (1937).
In the case just cited the court reasoned that since the statute provides for the apprehension and
punishment of a class that menaces
the security of persons and property the act does not deprive the
defendants of due process, and that
it was within the province of the
legislature to classify persons with
respect to the criminal law providing the classification is a reasonable
one. This latter argument also disposing of the equal protection objection that was raised. Two other
contentions were raised in the principal case. The first concerned the
defense of double jeopary which the
court summarily disposes of by saying that "no prior conviction was
even suggested" The other, that of
the act being ex post facto, was
thrown out on the ground that the
act was based not on punishing convicted criminals because they are
such, but on voluntary membership in a gang and voluntary abstention from work.
The New Jersey Court, in attempting to answer the equal protection allegations has failed anywhere to distinguish the ability of
the legislature to classify affirmative conduct resulting in a certain
type of criminality and what the
legislature did here, namely, make
reputation an offense. In the one
case the classification results because of the commission of an act,
in the other the classification attaches through association. This
goes even further than the Conspiracy statutes which do not make
association of itself unlawful, but
rely on the illegality of the purpose, or the means used to obtain
that purpose.

The present statute is not the
first attempt by states to make
criminal the association with disreputable persons. An outstand'
ing example of a similar act was
the amendment to the Illinois vagrancy act of 1933 which sought to
classify as vagabonds those who
were reputed to be habitual violators of the criminal law or carriers of concealed weapons. Ill.
Sess. Law (1933) p. 489, §1. The
Illinois Supreme Court in declaring the act unconstitutional stated
that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, and that the
object of the due process clause is
to preserve the personal and property rights of a person against arbitrary action. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301(1934).
A similar Michigan statute likewise
was declared unconstitutional in
People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 463,
250 N. W. 520 (1933). See also
Feigen, Constitutionality of "Public Enemy" Laws (1934) 24 J. of
Crim. Law 954; and Tipton, "Validity of the Reputation Amendment
to the Vagrancy Statute" (1934) 25
J. of Crim. Law 279, 92 A. L. R.
f228.
The due process argument as it
will be raised in the Court will be
largely on the broad principle followed by a majority of the courts
and to which the United States
Supreme Court has committed itself, viz., that due process is satisfied if the statute is sufficiently
certain and definite to inform citizens of the acts it is intended to
prohibit.
14 Am. Juris. 779;
United States v. Cohen Grocery,
255 U. S. 81 (1920); Whitney v.
People of the State of California,
274 U. S. 357 (1926); People v.
Belcastro, supra; State v. Gaynor,
119 N. J. L 582, 197 Atl. 360 (1938).
It seems as a corollary that the act
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must be reasonable and not one
which might subject the accused to
an arbitrary invasion of his personal rights. The question here for
determination, then, is whether the
act is such a definite and reasonable one that the accused is protected.
It seems that section 4 of the act
steps beyond the just and necessary legislation needed to protect
This section,
the community.
quoted heretofore, has potentialities of tremendous social significance. The discretion in the application of such a statute, must be
guarded with a scrutiny not becoming criminal legislation. While
it is useful in punishing those who
associate with criminal intent, there
is no safeguard for the innocent
who by circumstances fall within
its terms. Surely it was not the
intention of the legislature to see
ordinary citizens, possessing no
criminal intentions whatsoever,
suffer such extreme punishment
with no protection other than the
discretion of the prosecutor. To
allow this kind of a statute to remain on the books seems only too
apparent an infringement of the
personal liberties protected by the
due process clause of the 14th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
JOHN L. COLMAR.
VOID SENTENCE-RECOGNITION

OF

GOOD TIME SERVED UNDER.-[FedSubstantial disagreement
eral]
exists among the courts of the nation concerning the judicial recognition to be accorded an imprisonment illegal because of the invalidity of the sentence. The learning
devoted to this field of criminal
procedure is meager; and this because of the relative paucity of
cases presenting the problem.

The legal attributes of a void
sentence to be evaluated in resentencing a prisoner who had served
under an illegal imprisonment were
considered in the case of King v.
United States, 98 F. (2d) 291
(App. D. C. 1938); and it was held
that a void sentence may not be ignored "in determining whether a
resentence subjects the prisoner to
more punishment than the legal
maximum for his offense." That
is, if the time served under the void
sentence coupled with the term of
the resentence were in excess of
the statutory maximum of prescribed punishment, the new sentence would be illegal, or rather,
the excessive part would be invalidated. Cf. In re Bonner, 151 U. S.
242 (1893). Thus a credit is given
to the prisoner for the length of
the former incarceration; and such
credit will be presumed to have
been applied if the new term added
to the actual imprisonment under
the void sentence is within the
court's jurisdiction in the imposition of punishment.
As was recognized in the case
of Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.
(2d) 868, 880 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936),
jurisdictions are in disagreement as
to whether credit should be given
for imprisonment under an illegal
sentence upon a valid resentence.
The extreme view is taken by the
Alabama court in Minto v. State, 9
Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913), and
Ex parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 486, 69
So. 442 (1915) that a void sentence
is without legal significance or application. In the Minto case, supra,
the court argued: "The defendant
could not have served any part of
a former sentence of imprisonment, as there has been no such
sentence which the law can recognize." The antithesis of this is
found in the Kentucky court's view

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES

in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187
Ky. 760, 220 S. W. 1045 (1920),
wherein it was stated that in resentencing the defendants - the
court being unconcerned as to
whether the original sentence was
void or merely erroneous-full
credit should be allowed for time
served under the erroneous sentence. The court, motivated by
justice rather than legal metaphysics, said: "It would be an injustice, as well as a flagrant invasion
of their legal rights, to require
them to serve their term, or any
part thereof, twice." Ibid., at 1046.
In Bennet v. Hollowel, 203 Iowa
352, 212 N. W. 70: (1927) not the
remotest corollary of Minto v.
State, supra, is recognized. The
Iowa court goes even farther than
the liberal Kentucky court in attaching legal attributes to a void
sentence. The petitioner was originally sentenced to seven years in
the penitentiary for the crime of
false pretenses. After having served
five months the prisoner escaped,
was tried and convicted of the
crime of escape, and was given a
five year term in the penitentiary,
which was to commence at the expiration of the seven year sentence.
The original sentence was void for
want of jurisdiction; after having
served sixty months under it, the
prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus. The court, in issuing the writ,
held that the time served under the
void sentence, which was equivalent to the new sentence, should be
deemed to apply to the latter sentence. The result is far-reaching
in that time served under an illegal sentence for the crime of
false pretenses is applied to a valid
sentence for an entirely unrelated
offense, to-wit, "escape."
It is
highly probable that the dotrine of
this case will be confined to factual

739
situations as peculiar and sympathetic as the present.
The Delaware Court, in Kozlowski v. Board of Trustees of NetL
Castle County Workhouse, 2 Harr
29, 118 Atl. 596 (1921), joined the
jurisdictions dissenting from the
Minto v. State doctrine. The petitioner, after having served fourteen days under a void sentence,
was resentenced for the statutory
maximum of one year. The court,
in allowing habeas corpus, held
that the fourteen days served under the void sentence plus the one
year resentence was in excess of
the legal maximum. The subsequent Delaware decision in Biddle
v. Board of Trustees of New Castle
Workhouse, 3 Harr 432, 138 Atl. 631
(1927), did not repudiate, but
soundly qualified the holding in the
Kozlowski case, supra. The attitude expressed there is that, though
incarceration before valid sentence
added to such sentence may exceed
the prescribed maximum, the prisoner cannot be discharged on habeas corpus before having served
that part of the term which the
court could legally impose. Or,
conversely, the prisoner could be
released if imprisonment before
resentence coupled with the time
of incarceration under the valid
sentence was equal to or in excess
of the legal limit of confinement.
This is an application of the severability theory of an excessive sentence (In re Bonner, supra; 51 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 377, Note 2) to a
situation where excessive punishment resulted from a failure to
consider the duration of imprisonment under a void sentence. The
excess is invalidated and the prisoner is required to serve the remainder. Concluding that such a
result is logical and reasonable and
entailing no hardships, the court
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said: "The State is protected, the to be detached of legal significance
conviction is undisturbed, and the as far as good time rights are concerned-the same thing legal and
prisoner is not injured by the mistake because his discharge will be illegal in one decision. Suffice it
granted when he has served the to say that if the court is correct
legal part of his sentence." Ibid., in according recognition to the
duration of incarceration under a
at 632 of 138 Atl..
To give judicial recognition to void sentence, in determining
incarceration under an illegal sen- whether the resentence was excestence in determining the term of sive-and logic and justice make
the resentence is a result compat- such a position tenable-consisible with reason and justice. To tency demands that the accrual of
refuse it would bring "a result good time under the void sentence
more consistent with dry logic than be given the same recognition. It
natural justice." 9 A. L. R. 958. is strange logic that places as thing
within judicial contemplation on
Full credit should be given for an
illegal imprisonment; and if upon the inhale and withdraws it on the
exhale.
resentence excessive punishment is
As to the first proposition: 1.
inflicted in that the time served
under the void sentence has been The statute, providing that "when
ignored, that part of the sentence a prisoner has two or more senbeyond statutory limits should be tences, the aggregate of his several
invalidated. The prisoner is neither sentences shall be the basis upon
which his deduction shall be estipenalized by nor permitted to capimated" (18 USCA Sec. 710), has
talize upon judicial blunder.
In the instant case, the court dis- been held to refer to two sentences
which are in existence at the same
allows a deduction from a valid resentence a good time allowance in time. Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F.
(2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). Recrespect of time previously served
ognizing the legal significance of a
under a void sentence. This conclusion was derived from two void sentence (Jackson v. Commonthoughts: 1. That such good time wealth, supra), it would not abuse
allowance was not within the purthe prerogative of statutory interview of the statute. 18 USCA S'ec. pretation to have the statute comprehend, also, a situation, as in the
709a, 710; 2. That as "the former
sentence was not only at an end present case, where the two senbefore the new sentence was im- tences arose from and applied to
posed but was also 'void,' i. e., not but one offense. Why the statute
entitled to legal effect," the good should be held to apply in a case
of two or more sentences, each imtime earned under the void senposed for a different offense,
tence cannot be considered in determining whether the resentence though pronounced at the same
time, and not in the case of two
exceeded the statutory maximum.
As for the second contention:
sentences imposed at different intervals, but addressed to the same
By some judicial prestidigitation
the void sentence is to have legal offense, is not easily understandeffect "in determining whether a able. It is a hard presumption that
resentence subjects the prisoner to Congress intended a forfeiture bemore punishment than the legal cause of an error in the judicial
maximum for his offense," but is process of sentencing notwithstand-
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ing prisoner's meritorious behavior. inal court of Marion County on
2. The provision (18 USCA Sec. his own motion appointed special
prosecutors, over the objection of
709a) that a sentence of imprisonment "shall commence to run from the regular prosecuting attorney,
the date on which such person is to investigate suspected violations
received at the penitentiary," and of the law concerning a primary
the prohibition of any other methelection. Reports released by the
recount commissioners in contests
od of computation in a sentence,
ought not to block the accrual of respecting the nomination for the
good time earned under the void offices of mayor and sheriff in the
Marion County primary election
sentence from consideration in reindicated that one of the regular
sentencing. If judicial cognizance
be accorded the void sentence prosecutor's deputies served as
under the Jackson v. Common- clerk of the board in one of the
precincts where discrepancies bewealth doctrine, which was approved in the principal case, then tween the official and the recount
the sentence did commence to run vote appeared. Twelve members
at the date of actual incarceration.
of the prosecutor's staff were also
The resentence does not abrogate candidates in this primary. In an
the rights derived from the prior original action in the Indiana Supreme Court by the regular proseimprisonment. Ex parte Silva, 38
cutor a writ of prohibition against
Cal. App. 98, 175 Pac. 481 (1918);
Ex parte Bouchard, 38 Cal. App. the special prosecutors was granted.
441, 176 Pac. 692 (1918); but see The Court said, "The prosecuting
Ex parte Fritz, 179 Cal. 415, 177 attorney is a constitutional judicial
Pac. 157 (1918) which disapproves .officer and cannot be removed upon
mere suspicion or rumor but only
of the Silva and Bouchard cases
without challenging their reasonwhere it is established that he is an
ing. See also State ex rel Bone v. interested party or otherwise clearBarr, Warden, 133 Iowa 132, 110 N. ly incapacitated." State ex. rel.
W. 280 (1"907) citing with approval Spencer v. CriminalCourt of MarHoward v. United States, 75 Fed. ion County, et al., 15 N. E. (2d)
986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
1020 (1938).
It may be argued that by allowActing under a statute, Ind. Rev.
ing a credit for good time under
Stats. (Burns 1914) §9407, giving it
the illegal sentence the rule would a right to appoint a special prosealso prohibit any good time priv- cutor for a term when the regular
ileges under the resentence in prosecutor is absent, the Indiana
event of misbehavior during the Court has appointed a special
void incarceration. Justice dictates prosecutor when the regular prosethe adoption of a rule of law favorcutor is absent, Choen v. State, 85
ing good behavior rather than Ind. 209 (1882), where the prosecapitulating to misbehavior.
cuting attorney -is disqualified by
having been attorney for the acLEONARD SHAPiRo
cused for many years, Perfect v.
State, 197 Ind. 401, 141 N. E. 52
EMPLOYMENT BY COURT OF SPE(1923), where he was disqualified
CIAL PROSECUTOR WHERE PROSECUTto act in his official capacity when
ING ATTORNEY Is DIsQUALIFIED.one of his deputies was charged
[Indiana] The judge of the crimwith crime growing out of alleged

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
official misconduct, State ex. tel.
Williams v. Ellis, 184 Ind. 307, 11'2
N. E. 98 (1916), and where he was
disqualified because of political interest from conducting the prosecution of an election inspector indicted for consenting to the removal of a hundred and fifty ballots from his possession as election
official, Huffman v. State, 183 Ind.
698, 109 N. E. 401 (1915).
The Illinois and Missouri courts
hold similar statutes as merely declaratory of the common law and
have said that the courts have inherent power to appoint a special
prosecutor when the prosecuting
attorney is disqualified by interest
to act in his official capacity: State
v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S. W. 83
(1924) (when his car and defendant's car were in a collision); Wilson v. Marshall County, 257 Ill.
App. 220 (1930) (where the county
board was permitted to employ
special attorneys in a particular
case when the regular prosecutor
was disqualified and the court had
made a valid appointment).
However, whether the court acts
under a statute or under its inherent power the interest of the prosecutor must first be established as
a fact, State ex. rel. Williams v.
Ellis, supra, State v. Jones, supra.
The appointment cannot be made
on what the court in the principal
case calls "mere suspicion or rumor" of such interest, but the appointment can be made as in the
instant case by the court on its
own motion, Huffman v. State,
supra, or upon the petition of a
citizen, People v. Northrup, 184 Ill.
App. 638 (1914).
In State ex. rel. Williams v. Ellis,
supra, the Indiana court faced a
situation similar to that in the principal case and upheld the appointment of a special prosecutor. But

in that case the grand jury requested the appointment of a special attorney and the regular prosecutor filed his written consent to
the appointment, whereas in the
instant case the appointment was
made on the ex parte motion of the
judge and over the objection of
the regular prosecutor. In Huffman v. State, supra, the Indiana
court again upheld the appointment of a special prosecutor although made on the motion of the
judge and over the objection of the
regular prosecutor. In that case,
however, there was an actual indictment of the person held to disqualify the regular prosecutor because of interest whereas in the
principal case the court seems to
specifically object to the fact that
the appointment was made "upon
mere suspicion or rumor" before
the guilt of anyone had been definitely established.
Although under the Indiana statute or under the inherent power of
the court there is authority for the
appointment of a special attorney
by the judge on his own motion
and over the objection of the regular prosecutor when the prosecutor is disqualified, there is no authority for such an appointment
before the interest of. the regular
prosecutor has been established as
a fact-in this case by the subsequent indictment of the deputy
prosecutor and other members of
the regular prosecutor's staff. Consequently in its decision in the
principal case the court is well
within the law.
On the question of whether such
appointments actually promote justice there are convincing arguments on both sides. The main
objection to this practice of employing special prosecutors is that
"they are usually employed by
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structions, and that the appearance
of the prosecuting witness, who
stated he was eighteen years of age
at the time of the sale, was that of
an adult. The trial court refused
to instruct the jury in this manner,
and its decision was affirmed by
the South Dakota. Supreme Court.
Malum prohibitum acts are those
barred under penalty for the public interest; they are not crimes inherently evil in themselves, but
are made crimes by a legislature
which believes that such acts
should be prohibited for the common good. Whether scienter is a
necessary element of a statutory
crime, though not expressed in the
statute, is a question of legislative
intent to be answered only by a
construction of a statute. Punishment for an illegal act done by one
who is ignorant of the facts which
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALES TO
make it illegal, is not contrary to
MINos.-[South Dakota] The dedue process of law. United States
fendant, in the recent South Dav. Baiint et al., 258 U. S. 250 (1922).
kota case of State v. Schull, 279 N. When a statute makes an act inW. 241 (1938), was convicted for dictable, irrespective of guilty
violation of chapter twelve of the knowledge, then even "sincere igSpecial Session Laws for 1933 norance of fact" is not a defense.
which states: "It shall be unlawState v. Dorman, 9 S. D. 528, 70 N.
ful for any licensee under the proW. 848 (1897). In State v. Sasse,
visions of this act to sell or give 6 S. D. 212, 60 N. W. 853 (1894),
any non-intoxicating beer or wine involving a statute similar to that
to any person under the age of of the principal case, it was held
eighteen years." Relying on section that since the word "knowingly"
3583, subdivision five, Revised Code was omitted from the act in that
of 1919, the provisions of which section relating to minors, and no
are: "All persons are capable of word of similar import was used
committing crimes, except those to denote such meaning, it is evibelonging to the following classes dent that good faith is not import. . . persons who committed the ant, nor proof of criminal intent
act under an ignorance or mistake necessary for conviction where
of fact which disproves any crim- there had been in fact a sale of ininal "intent . . .," the defendant toxicating liquor to one under the
requested the trial court to instruct age of twenty-one years. Other
the jury that the defendant acted jurisdictions have similarly held
in good faith, the beer being sold that the mere fact of selling intoxby an employee during his absence icating liquors to a minor constiand contrary to his express in- tues the entire offense. Seele v.
private individuals solely to secure
a conviction and their zeal and
energies are bent to accomplish
that end losing sight of the fact
that the accused is entitled to a
fair trial." State v. Morreaux, 254
Mo. 398, f62 S. W. 158 (1914).
However it is said that "the prosecuting attorney owes a duty to
both the state and the defendant
and if the facts are such as to preclude the exercise of his full duty
to both he should step aside." State
ex. rel. Williams v. Ellis, supra. In
the case of a political investigation
such as this the better view would
seem to be that which sanctions
such appointments in order that in
the eyes of the public, at least, the
investigation will appear to be conducted without partisanship.
MALCOLM NICKOLSON.
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State, 85 Neb. 109, 122 N. W. 686
(1909); State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt.
51"4, 68 Atl. 658 (1908); State v.
Nichols, 67 W. Va. 659, 69 S. E. 304
(1910).
The majority of the states have
statutes prohibiting the sale of
liquors to minors wherein the
word "knowingly" or one of equivalent import is absent. The justification for such an extreme rule is
that the act in question is a police
regulation, and the legislature intended to inflict the penalty, irrespective of the knowledge or motives of the offender. The object
of the statute was to prohibit absolutely sales of liquors to minors
by persons licensed to sell, and the
latter, in procuring their licenses,
are fully aware of the penalties for
violation thereof, and accordingly,
act at their own peril. State v.
Cain, 9 W. Va. 559 (1876); State v.
Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60 (1869). It is a
risk incident to the business defendant undertook to conduct, and
since he receives the gains connected therewith, he must therefore assume with it all the hazards.
McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601
(1873). Texas courts are among
a minority in holding that though
it is unnecessary under Tex. Ann.
Code (Vernon, 1925), art. 693, for
the state to prove that the defendant, in a prosecution for giving
liquor to a minor, knew that the
prosecuting witness was a minor,
since the word "knowingly" was
omitted from the statute, nevertheless, mistake of fact is available as
a defense under article 41. Gilbreath v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 110,
295 S. W. 925 (1927).
The changing attitudes of jurisdictions on the subject of absolute
liability in prosecutions concerning
liquor sales to minors are exemplified in the following Michigan cases.

In Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 200
(1878), it was decreed: "It cannot be assumed that the legislature
would attempt such a wrong as to
punish as criminal an act which involves no criminal intent. There
can be no crime where there is no
criminal mind." But in People v.
Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N. W. 365
(1884), the court said: "It was held
in Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 200,
under a former statute, that one
should not be convicted of the offense of selling liquor to a minor
who had reason to believe and did
believe he was of age; but I doubt
if we ought so to hold under the
statute of 1881, the purpose of
which very plainly is, as I think, to
compel every person who engages
in the sale of intoxicating drinks to
keep within the statute at his peril." A later Michigan statute of
1887, however, declared a sale of
liquor to any minor as mere prima
facie evidence of an intent to violate the law, and accordingly, defendant was exempted from liability when he relied on the minor's
statements that he was of full age
at the time of the sale, which was,
made in good faith, since the court
held that criminal intent was material. People v. Welch, 71 Mich.
548, 39 N. W. 747 (1888).
In the principal case, defendant
was convicted, even though the sale
was consummated by an employee
during his absence, without authority and contrary to instructions. The courts differ in their
attitudes toward liability of the
master for illegal sales of intoxicating liquor transacted by the
agent. According to some, if the
general course of the business is
legal, the principal is not criminally
liable for the unlawful sales made
by his clerk without his knowledge
or consent, or in his absence and
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contrary to his instructions. Daniel v. State, 149 Ala. 44, 43 So. 22
(1907); People v. Kryl, 168 Ill. App.
298 (1912); Lathrope v. State, 51
Ind. 192 (1875). Under this rule,
the master is not liable unless such
an unlawful act was directed, or
knowingly assented to, acquiesced
in, or permitted by the employer.
Elliot v. State, 19 Ariz. 1, 164 Pac.
1179 (1917). Kentucky, however,
held that the employer is liable for
violations of the liquor laws by his
servants or agents while pursuing
the ordinary business entrusted to
them. Paducah v. Jones, 126 Ky.
809, 104 S. W. 971 (1907). Other
jurisdictions have further extended
liability, even where the violations
were committed in the master's absence, and without his knowledge
or consent. People v. Roby, supra;
Reismier v. State, 148 Wis. 593, 135
N. W. 153 (1912). Liability has
similarly been imposed where the
act was contrary to express instructions of the principal. If an
agent is left to conduct a liquor
business, and he infringes any law
or statute, his principal is responsible even though such agent acted
contrary to his principal's direct
commands. Carrol v. State, 63 Md.
551, 3 Atl. 29 (1885); Riley v. State,
43 Miss. 397 (1870); State v. Gilmore, supra. But, in Steinkuhler
v. State, 100 Neb. 95, 158 N. W. 437
(1916), it was held that in sales of
intoxicating liquors to minors, although the owner of the saloon is
responsible for acts of his servants,
and a sale by a servant is, in law, a
sale made by the saloon-keeper
himself, nevertheless, where the
sale is consummated in the defendant's absence, and in violation of
his orders, and without his authority, the master is held free from
criminal prosecution.
Where courts have held that ab-
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solute liability is imposed on the
employer, they have expressed justification for such a strict rule in
similar terms to the following extract from O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 108 Va. 882, 890, 92 S. E.
373, 376 (1908): "The cases which
hold that a principal is bound for
the acts of his agent, done not only
without his authority, but in violation of his instructions in the
making of the sale of ardent spirits, constitute an exception to the
general rule, that the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply
to criminal cases; and . . . the
doctrine is based upon the postulate that a man who engages in this
business as a licensee of the state
engages in it at his peril, and must
see to it that the requirements of
the law are rigidly complied with,
and is responsible for any failure
of any agent of his to comply with
those requirements.
Recognizing the fact that in general, governments aim to protect
women and- minors,. and to accomplish such end, have so legislated
as to make it an offense to sell
liquors to minors, nevertheless, the
rule seems too harsh to hold, as in
the principal case, that an employer
is liable for a sale by his servant
even though it was made in his
absence and without his consent,
and contrary to his instructions. As
stated in Commissioner v. Stevens,
153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. 992 (1:891),
it is carrying the doctrine of criminal responsibility too far to'convict
one for an innocent mistake by his
clerk, where the principal sincerely
and honestly intended that his instructions be followed in good faith,
and he was not negligent in the
selection of his clerks, nor in the
precautions which he prescribed
for their guidance.
MARVIN S. FENCHEL.
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CORPUS -

UNCORROBO-

RATED TESTIMONY IN PROSECUTION
FOR RAPE OF AN INSANE FEMALE.-

[Wisconsin] Defendant was arrested on a charge of having ravished a female over sixteen years
of age, by force and against her
will. When the prosecutrix was
sworn, counsel for the defendant
objected to her competency on the
ground that she was of such limited
intelligence and suffering from
such insane delusions and hallucinations as to be incompetent as
a witness. At the preliminary examination the prosecutrix showed a
"lack of capacity to recollect and
to narrate the facts" of the transaction, as well as a "failure to understand and appreciate her obligations as a witness." Her testimony-, if admitted, did not show
rape by force, but defendant could
have been bound over and charged
with committing fornication with
a female who was insane-Wis.
Stat. (1935), sec. 351.06. The court
held that the prosecutrix was
wholly incompetent as a witness,
and since there was no other evidence warranting the holding of
defendant for trial, the trial court
was in error in refusing a writ of
habeas corpus. Hancock v. Hallman, 281 N. W. 703 (1938).
The court assumed its duty on
habeas corpus to examine the evidence and treated the examining
magistrate as outside of his jurisdiction since no competent evidence was found upon which he
could properly have acted. Because the preliminary examination
is statutory and special, evidence
tending to establish the facts justifying a commitment, or holding
to bail for trial, is jurisdictional
like any other statutory essential.
State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110
Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901). See

also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. 75
(1807).
The Wisconsin statute under
which defendant might have been
held (sec. 351.06) is an outgrowth
of the crime of rape by force. Under earlier Wisconsin law and in
other
jurisdictions,
defendant
would have been charged with rape
by force; the force being implied
from the victim's lack of ability to
give consent. Whitaker v. State,
50 Wis. 518, 7 N. W. 431' (1880).
Wharton, Crim. Law (12th Ed.
1931), sec. 704.
Prosecution for rape on the basis
of uncorroborated testimony of the
accusing female has always presented a difficult problem for the
courts. 26 J. Crim. L. 463. The
act of intercourse almost always
takes place in such secrecy that it
is impossible to present other persons who knew of the circumstances or who witnessed the act.
I Hale P. C. 634. The closest witness whom the prosecution was
able to present in the principal case
was a mail carrier: prosecutrix
got out of defendant's car to take
the mail from him and then got
back in. In Rice v. State, 195 Wis.
181, 217 N. W. 697 (1928), for example, a twelve year old girl
claimed to have had intercourse
with defendant near an open highway during the daylight. The court
in reversing the conviction said,
"Sex crimes, even by depraved
criminals, are crimes of seclusion
and secrecy." For this reason the
courts will not sustain such convictions unless the testimony and
surrounding
circumstances
are
clear and decisive. Cleveland v.
State, 211 Wis. 565, 248 N. W. 408
(1933). Where the evidence of the
prosecuting witness bears upon its
face evidence of unreliability, to
sustain a conviction there should
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be corroboration by other evidence
as to the principal facts relied on
to constitute the crime. O'Boyle
v. State, 100 Wis. 296, 75 N. W. 989
(1898). In the principal case a
physician who made an examination a few hours after the alleged
incident testified that although
prosecutrix had suffered an internal injury at one time, it could
not have occurred such a short
time before. He said that there
might have been some penetration,
however. This rule requiring corroboration has special significance
where the prosecutrix is a person
of feeble mind. Donovan v. State,
140 Wis. 570, 122 N. W. 1022 (1909).
In the principal case the prosecutrix was not able to give her correct age and was able to tell her
story only through leading questions.
Thus, it can be seen how difficult the problem is rendered when
the uncorroborated prosecutrix is
feebleminded or insane. Even up
into the nineteenth century such
persons, except for lunatics during
lucid intervals, were totally barred
from acting as witnesses. A superstition prevailed which branded
them as the objects of divine wrath.
Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 492. They
were one of the classes listed by
Lord Coke as being barred from
giving testimony. Co. Litt. 6b. At
first there seems to have been some
tendency on the part of our state
courts to follow this inflexible rule
of exclusion.. Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 362 (1813),
Armstrong v. Timmons, 3 Harr.
(Del.) 342 (1841), Phebe et al. v.
Prince et al., 1 Miss. 131 (1822)
obiter.
As a result of the scientific advancement of the nineteenth century this superstition was overthrown. In 1851 in Regina v. Hill,

2 Den. & P. C. 244, a patient at a
lunatic asylum suffering under a
delusion that spirits were talking
to him was allowed to testify as
to the killing of a fellow patient.
Lord Campbell, C. J., said that
"The proper test must always be,
does the lunatic understand what
he is saying, and does he understand the obligation of an oath?"
This modern doctrine was expressly followed by the United States
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519
(1882). Almost with unanimity the
various state courts seem to have
adopted the view against automatic
exclusion. Wigmore, op. cit., Note
26 A. L. R. 1491, Kendall v. May,
92 Mass. 59 (1865), Holcomb v.
Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177, (1859)
Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.
W. 987 (1911). An elaboration of
the view may be found in State v.
Brown et al., 2 Marvel (Del.) 380,
36 AtI. 458 (1896), where the court
refused to accept a certificate of
admission to an insane, asylum as a
prima facie presumption of insanity
to make a witness incompetent to
testify.
The question of competency is
clearly one of law to be determined
by the court and in that determination it may be found proper to call
other witnesses to testify. District
of Columbia v. Armes, supra. In
the principal case the mother of
prosecutrix testified that her
daughter had to be helped in such
simple tasks as dressing and eating. The question of competency
of a witness should be disposed of
as soon as it arises and before the
witness is allowed to testify to the
facts in issue. Weeks v. State, 126
Md. 223, 94 Atl. 774 (191"5). However, mental infirmity ordinarily
goes to the weight of the witness'
evidence, not to competency to
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testify, unless the impairment is the female is of unsound mind does
substantially total or such as to
not per se establish her incomperender the person wholly uncontency. State v. Simes, 12 Idaho 310,
scious of the obligations of an oath. 85 Pac. 914 (1906); People v. Perry,
Burns v. State, supra. In the prin26 Cal. App. 143, 146 Pac. 44 (1914);
cipal case the attempt to elicit from
State v. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86,
187 N. W. 971 (1922); State v.
the prosecutrix an expression of
any clear sense of moral responsiLeonard, 60 S. D. 144, 244 N. W.
bility was futile.
88 (1932); Beard v. State, 37 Okla.
The situation presented in the Cr. 62, 256 Pac. 354 (1927); Wilprincipal case is not a new one in
kinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282
American criminal law but the Pac. 257 (1929).
question of the prosecutrix's comSeveral states have a statutory
petency seems to have been disprohibition against insane persons
cussed mainly on appeal from contestifying but such statutes have
viction rather than on appeal from been construed to follow the gena refusal to allow a writ of ha- eral rule of Regina v. Hill. Pittsbeas corpus. Thus, in an early
burgh & W. R. Co. v. Thompson,
New York case, People v. McGee, 82 Fed. 720 (1897), State v. Simes,
1 Denio. 19 (1845), defendant had supra. Wisconsin has no such
been convicted of the rape of a positive statutory prohibition, but
thirty year old imbecile who was on the contrary has a statute which
able to communicate only by signs. codifies the rule of Regina v. Hill.
Other witnesses had been allowed Wis. Stat: (1938) sec. 325.30.
to tell of her communications made
The rule seems to be different
immediately after the alleged epi-- under a Texas criminal statute
sode, but the prosecutrix did not
which says that "Insane persons
testify because it was thought that are not competent to testify, etc."
she did not have sufficient intelliVernon's Code of Crim. Proc., Art.
gence to be examined as a wit768. The broad rule of automatic
ness. In the face of other convincexclusion was set out in Lee v.
ing evidence, the court was forced
State, 43 Tex. Cr. 285, 64 S.W. 1047
to invoke the rule against hearsay
(1901), where because the indictment set out the insanity of the
and reverse the conviction.
As in the principal case, howprosecutrix she was held not to be
ever, the prosecution seems to have a competent witness. The harshusually presented the offended fe- ness of any such rule is demonmale as a witness in spite of her strated by a statement of the Texas
mental infirmity. With the poscourt itself in reversing the convicsible exception of Texas, the courts tion of a defendant who had been
seem to hold that if the prosecucharged with rape on an insane
trix has sufficient understanding to negro woman by actual force. The,
appreciate the nature and obligacourt said that the facts "all tend
tion of an oath and sufficient cato show most conclusively and alpacity to observe and describe cormost beyond a doubt that she had
rectly the facts in regard to which indeed been ravished as she stated
she is called to testify, there is no that she had; and if, under our law,
reason why her testimony should she be held a competent witness
be excluded. 26 A. L. R. 1491. The under any circumstances, we would
fact that the indictment alleges that feel warranted in concluding from
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the record, as it is shown to us,
that the defendant's guilt was fully
established by the evidence."
Lopez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 487,
17 S. W. 1058 (1891) The Texas
court itself shows a tendency to restrict the rule. See Hubbard v.
State, 66 Tex. Cr. Rep. 378, 147
S. W. 260 (1912).
It is submitted that the flexible
test as to competency of Regina v.
Hill which the Wisconsin court has
applied is the only one compatible
with modern understanding of
mental impairment. It must be
pointed out, however, that the
principal case is somewhat unusual in two respects: first, rather
than totally excluding her, the
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feebleminded or insane witness is
usually allowed to testify before
a jury who may take her story for
what it is worth; that is, her men:
tal infirmity usually goes to her
credibility rather than to her competence as a witness. And secondly, courts of appeal are generally
reluctant to judge the real character or degree of intelligence of a
witness from mere paper evidence.
The judge or examining magistrate
who comes face to face with the
witnesses has a superior means to
evaluate their testimony. New
York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner,
265 Fed. 204; writ of certiorari dismissed, 252 U. S.591 (1920).
ROBERT FREDERICK WERNLE.

